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Abstract 
 
Only recently, the average Australian residential property market was experiencing negative 
growth caused by the decrease of average housing prices in the major capital cities, in particular, 
Sydney and Melbourne.  However, other cities were registering positive growth.  In a decade, the 
average house price in Brisbane has increased by more than 150 per cent.  In 1994, the highest average 
house price in Brisbane was around $310,000 but in 2004 it reached $780,000.  The high appreciation 
expectation has also influenced the choice of housing transaction method.  In a boom market, auction 
in Sydney and Melbourne contribute a certain level of residential property market share. In Sydney, 
there was 50 per cent of all real estate sold by auction marketing. During the same boom period, the 
Brisbane auction market only had 20 to 30 per cent market share.  
This initial study aims to explore Brisbane housing auction market and the risk/benefit analysis 
to stakeholders in the auction mechanism.  This study analyses the results from in-depth interview of 
representative of stakeholders and recent sales data (mid August to early October 2005).  It was also 
found that vendors gain more benefits than buyers in the auction market.  However, the strict terms of 
conditions that apply in auction transactions relative to the private treaty sales have discouraged 
buyers from utilising the auction process.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has released the first negative annual growth (from 
June 2004 to June 2005) in average house price indexes for the eight capital cities in Australia (ABS, 
2005) since 1996.  This negative growth has been largely caused by a decrease in housing prices in 
Sydney (-5.0%), Melbourne (-1.4%) and Hobart (-0.8%).  In the same period, Brisbane house prices 
increased 1.8 per cent with the residential property market in Brisbane being a regular topic in both the 
community and the media as prices soared during the first half of 2003.  
This high appreciation expectation over the decade had a direct influence on the choice of 
housing transaction method.  Since a property represents about half of the net wealth of the average 
Australian it is not surprising that any decision made on the purchase and sale of property will be 
given the most careful attention.  There are generally three transaction methods to be considered by 
buyers and sellers: auction, tender and private treaty.   
Any alternative method needs a strategy for decision making in residential property 
transaction.  The ‘one price principle: one commodity – only one price’ never occurs in a property 
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market which has incomplete information.  There are an infinite number of non-arbitrage prices in the 
property market.  Thus, there is room for both sellers and buyers to develop a strategy to maximise 
their expected utility. 
This initial study aims to explore Brisbane housing auction market and the risk/benefit analysis 
to stakeholders using the auction mechanism.  This study analyses the results from direct observation, 
in-depth interviews of stakeholders’ representative and recent auction sales reports.  The remainder of 
this paper examines in sequence the literature review and methodology, the auction mechanisms and 
the housing auction market in Brisbane. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Methodology  
 
The findings of previous research are discussed in the following literature review which 
includes both listings and auctions in the housing market.  Research in the auction area comprises the 
housing auction system, mechanism and price comparisons with private treaty sales.  In the 
methodology section, the recruitment process, data sources and analyses are justified. 
 
a. Literature Review 
A number of housing market papers focus on the bargaining model and listing price 
mechanism.  One of prominent bargaining models is the one-shot game model which was introduced 
by Rubinstain (1982, 1985).  Maekawa (1996, 2003b) expanded Rubinstain’s bargaining model with 
incomplete information for the real estate market.  The previous studies in the listing market analysed 
the list price for active sellers without considering buyers information (Horowitz, 1992) and the 
stakeholders’ activities in the listing market (Yavas and Yange, 1994).  Knight, Sirmans and Turnbull 
(1994) conducted a study into the roles of the listing price in the determination of the selling price.  
Nishimura (1999) suggested, in the non-walrasian real estate market, the changes of transaction price 
have a great impact on the changes of seller’s intrinsic value.  Furthermore, the diversity of buyers’ 
reservation price was caused by incomplete information and the difference between the buyers’ 
financial capability. Maekawa (2003a, 2003b) analysed the optimal seller’s list price (reservation 
price) which was taking account of the buyers’ strategies and their dispersion in the imperfect real 
estate market.  
In the auction pricing side, Vickrey (1961) viewed the auction as an incomplete information 
game and proposed the famous auction theory ‘the revenue equivalence principle’ under ‘the 
independent private value auction’ circumstances.  Each bidder for one object (a property) has their 
subjected value, which is not affected by other persons, and therefore the different sale methods have 
the same expected revenue for the seller.  In contrast, McAfee, et. al.(2002) indicated the real estate 
sale will be impacted by the mechanism of sale, potential revenue, and the information disclosure 
because the real estate auction belongs to ‘common value not independent value auction 
circumstances’. Milgrom and Weber (1982), Quan (1994), Krishina (2002) point out in the ‘English 
Auction-Open Called Bid’, the bidders can share the information or outcry some information to rivals. 
This information can be used as a judgment for adjusting the bidding price. 
The auction mechanism is gaining acceptance as an effective method of disposal for 
commodities in general and real estate in particular. Cramton (1988) queries the auction theory.  The 
English Auction-Open Called Bid auction with ‘common value auction circumstances’ is an effective 
disposal method.  It optimises return in the auction mechanism and reduces the crisis of the winner’s 
curse.  Since the level of competition is an important factor, when the market is under weak 
competition, the price outcome from the English Auction system is unexpected.   
Previous research indicates that upgrading the efficiency of the auction price directly affects 
the house market.  One of auction methods so called price-sealed bid, which bidders do not know 
others’ bid price during auction process. In this method, one of the most influential attributes is the 
number of bidding processes (bidding times).  If the bids are below the reserve price, the first bidding 
process has failed.  Then the second bidding process (bidding time is two) might be offered at the 
discounted reserved price.  The higher bid times reflect a higher failure ratio which is caused by ‘over-
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Price-sealed Bid Auction 
Reserved price 
Bidding strategy 
n (bidders or call times) 
The English Auction 
valuation’ result for the reserved price.  If the vendor sets up the lower reserve price from the base 
price, the bidding time can be reduced and this also avoids breaking down the tender.  Lin, Tsai and 
Chang (1997) stated that the higher reserve price attracts a higher bid price.  Vendors put forward an 
upper-price limit to avoid lower-price bids when they make the reserve price decision.  The above 
phenomenon can provide an indicator for the auction on how to set up the reserve price.  Figure 1 
shows the relationship between auction price and number of bidders for different auction methods.   
  
 
Figure 1. The Relationship Between Auction Price and Bidders 
Source: Krishina (2002) 
 
 
Auction research tends to focus on two main thrusts: evaluating the probability of a positive 
auction outcome and comparing revenues from different auction formats to revenues from private 
negotiations.  This paper focuses on the auction market comparisons which is summarised in Table 1.  
Newell et al. (1993) examined the Sydney housing market finding that the median price of properties 
sold at auction was 3.6 per cent higher than properties sold by private treaty. Lusht (1996) stated that 
Australia used an English Auction-Open Called Bid system which attains half of the market share in 
the real estate market.  It has also found that auction properties sold at a premium in Melbourne.  This 
study attempted to control the model’s quality through adding a number of variables into the hedonic 
equation.  The analysis raises a number of questions, the most important attributes were the rationales 
of a relatively high percentage of sellers who appear to make suboptimal marketing choices, vendor 
bids impact, the use of undisclosed reserve price and the lack of commitment to the reserve price 
which is contrary to accepted auction theory. 
Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998) also found that auctioned properties can be sold for a 
premium which is above the average house prices. This study examined 5,344 transactions in 
Christchurch, New Zealand using a hedonic approach. It suggested a significant premium for 
auctioned properties in two of the four submarkets. In the Ireland property market, Stevenson and 
Young (2004) also suggested a premium to auctioned properties and applied an advanced modelling to 
evaluate the accuracy of auction pricing.  
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Table 1 : The Literature Review of the Auction Market Comparisons 
 
Author Auction 
System 
Real Estate Market Type Real Estate 
Type 
Evaluation 
Method 
Final-Price 
Comparison 
Newell et al, 
1993 
English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid 
Australia, Sydney, the 
auction market attains  
half of the market share 
in the real estate market 
Normal 
asset,  
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory 
Premium  
Lusht, 1996 English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid  
Australia, Melbourne, 
the auction market 
attains  half of the market 
share in the real estate 
market  
Normal 
asset,  
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory 
Premium  
Dotzour, 
Moorhead, 
Winkler, 
1998 
English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid 
New Zealand, the 
auction market attains  
lower market share  
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory 
Premium 
Mayer, 1998 English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid  
USA, the auction market 
attains lower market 
share 
Normal and 
npl asset 
mixed, 
residential 
house 
Reaped sale 
method  
Discount 
Marcus, 
2001 
English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid  
USA, the auction market 
attains lower market 
share 
NPL  by  
HUD 
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory 
 
Quan, 2002 English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid 
USA Residential 
vacancy 
land  
Hedonic price 
theory 
 
Stevenson, 
Young, 2004 
English 
Auction-Open 
Called Bid 
Ireland Normal 
asset,  
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory / value 
Premium 
Ong, Lusht, 
Mak, 2005 
English 
Ascending Bid 
Auction 
Singapore Foreclosed 
residential 
house 
Hedonic price 
theory / value 
Discount 
Lin, Tsai, 
Chang, 1997 
The First-Price 
Sealed Bid 
Taiwan  NPL  Hedonic price 
theory 
Discount 
Lin 2005, 
Lin, Huang 
(2005) 
The First-Price 
Sealed Bid 
Taiwan Foreclosed 
house from 
court 
Hedonic price 
theory/ semi-
parametric 
modeling 
Discount 
 
A number of studies in the USA have shown both theoretically and empirically, that auctioned 
properties should not sell at a premium in comparison to private treaty sales.  Mayer (1994) argued 
that as private sellers can wait longer they would receive a higher price from suitable buyers. The 
auction result is a discounted price which was referred to the cost of liquidity. Mayer (1998), Marcus 
(2001) and Quan (2002) indicated the auctions of real estate in USA are most frequently the result of 
mortgage foreclosure, divorce settlement and estate settlement. These circumstances suggested that 
auction sales are not comparable to private treaty sales in the USA market.  
Similarly, Taiwan has foreclosure property auctions which lead to discounted results and an 
ineffective auction market (Lin, Tsai and Chang, 1997; Lin, 2005; Lin and Huang, 2005).  Although 
Singapore uses the English ascending bid auction (not price-sealed bid as in Taiwan) for the 
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foreclosure property auctions, it also suggested discounted auction results (Ong, Lusht and Mak, 
2005). 
 
b.  Methodology 
This initial study uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses of both primary 
and secondary data to review the system, explain the auction market mechanism and its efficiency.  
These analyses are reported in section three and section four.   
The primary source of data is collected by interviewing stakeholder representatives, such as 
buyer, vendor, real estate agent, auctioneer and financial manager.  The respondents are selected using 
a snowball sampling technique which the latter respondents were introduced to by the earlier ones.  
Some of the transaction case studies are collected from direct observation of twenty auction events in 
September and early October 2005.   
The other transaction data is collected from secondary resources such as housing transaction 
databases, newspaper articles and websites.  This initial study is based on case studies from recent 
auction sales data in Brisbane (for periods from the end of August to early October 2005).  This study 
uses Queensland Valuations and Sales Database (QVAS) which compile the housing transaction lists 
from the property sales records of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines.  The data has 
some limitations in providing information needed for this study, such as the time-lag problem (around 
two months behind the transaction date) and non-specified transaction type.  Moreover, it is not 
possible to differentiate auction or private treaty sales in QVAS database.  In order to combat the 
above limitation, different sources of auction results have been compiled to illustrate the recent auction 
sales data in Brisbane.   
The only organisation which collected auction transaction information as well as private treaty 
sales is the Australian Property Monitors.  It published the recent property sales weekly in the Courier 
Mail (Queensland main newspaper) and updated the on-line publication of the latest 40 days of 
property sales in Home Price Guide® and www.domain.com.au (Fairfax Digital Network, 2005).  
Besides case studies from direct observation, this study uses the published recent auction sales 
information from newspaper and websites. 
 
 
3. Brisbane Auction Mechanism 
 
Almost all stakeholder representatives recommend that the key driver for a decision to use the 
auction as the sales vehicle for housing is the real estate agent.  Housing market prices can be revealed 
straight away in the auction transaction.  This section discusses the auction mechanism and compares 
it with private treaty sales.  Then, further discussion on benefit-risk analyses and stakeholders’ 
attitudes reveal the challenges in choosing auction sales.  The stakeholders who are included in the 
analyses are vendors, licensed real estate agents, licensed auctioneers, potential buyers and other 
related professionals in the housing transaction. 
The license is granted by Office for Fair Trading in Queensland after finalising courses and 
practical experiences.  After registering as a trainee auctioneer, two courses need to be completed: how 
to prepare and execute documentation (sales) and market property.  Then, a further three units of 
competency need to be fulfilled to obtain a full auctioneer license: implement and monitor financial 
systems, conduct property sales by auction and maintain a trust account.  The final requirement is 
conducting five auctions under the supervision of a licensed auctioneer.  All auctioneer courses are 
organised by Real Estate Institute of Queensland (REIQ, 2005a).   
An auctioneer works for a real estate agent full time or part time on the auction day.  Major 
real estate agents usually have a full time auctioneer, whereas, the small scale real estate agent signs a 
contract with a free-lance auctioneer for AUD 300 per auction.  Auctioneer conducts the auction in 
accordance with prescribed legislation such as PAMD (Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000), 
Trade Practice Act 1974 and Property Law Act 1974. 
As mentioned in the literature review, an English open-called bid auction is used in Australia.  
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate this auction mechanism.  The preparation stage is very extensive both from 
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the vendor and buyer perspectives.  As the vendor agrees to appoint an agent to use the auction to sell 
the property, the agent will put the property on the no price listing.  It will be advertised widely for at 
least four weeks in major newspapers and websites.   Then, the real estate agent compiles an 
information kit such as property details.  As a marketing tool, the information kit will consist of 
specific characteristics of the property which will be the best selling point.  For example, the site with 
development opportunities will be provided with development approval from the council.  In some 
cases, the vendor may decide to conduct building and pest inspections and provide the reports to 
potential buyers to minimise the disturbance to current occupiers.  This is not compulsory information 
in Brisbane but in Sydney the vendor have to declare property conditions and to provide the inspection 
results prior to auction day.  Sometimes, title information is also provided. 
Both potential buyers and sellers will need to provide an additional budget prior to the contract 
sales agreement being signed.  Vendors are required to budget for the appointment of an auctioneer 
(OFT, 2005) and this involves higher advertisement cost compared to private treaty sales arrangement.  
Buyers need to conduct up-front activities prior to the auction day, such as necessary searches and 
inspections as well as conduct financial arrangements.  These prior activities are needed to comply 
with the contract clause under the auction terms.  Although the auction and private treaty sales use the 
same standard contract (Contract for Houses and Land Fifth Editions - REIQ, 2005b; Units and 
Townhouses first edition) there are some differences in the terms of the auction compared to private 
treaty sales as follows: 
• A private treaty sale allows a 5 day cooling off period 
• Settlement terms is 30-60 days settlement with conditional terms, such as building or 
buyers inspection (clause 4) and financial approval (clause 3) 
• 5%-10% deposit (which only AUD1,000 to 2,000 as part of deposit need to be prepared on 
the contract date) 
In general, the auction advertisement will attract more potential buyers to inspect the property 
and come on the auction day.  Additional reminder information is produced by the agent for potential 
buyers such as brochure and phone calls.   
Although an offer might be submitted prior to or after the auction, in most cases the auction 
terms will still be applied.  The seller reserves the rights to accept any offer outside the auction day as 
shown in Figure 2.  If the auction process is unsuccessful, the real estate agent will use the exclusive 
listing and negotiate the listing price with the owner (see Figure 3). 
The agent assists the vendor in setting the reserved price by giving a price range from potential 
buyers which indicates the level of market interest.  Recent sales in the area may help to estimate the 
reserved price without a professional valuation process.  Although the real estate agent and auctioneer 
work on the best possible sale price for the vendor, they will try to push down the written reserved 
price slightly below market price.   
The real estate agent should not indicate a price to the potential buyer because it will provide 
the wrong impression and put off some potential buyers from turning up at the auction day.  In two 
events of on-site auction, the agent provided a price range as an illustration for the potential buyer.  In 
other properties (in-room auction), the agent advertised the ‘minimum’ buyer class (such as buyer 
above AUD 250,000) has affected the bidding process which the potential buyer believing that the 
property was not worth much more than the indicated price.   
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Figure 2.  Auction Process: Preparation Prior to Auction Day 
Source: Authors (2005) 
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Figure 3. Auction Process at the Auction Day 
Source: Authors (2005) 
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In general an auction takes place on-site, on Saturdays, following a series of public inspections.  
Some auction events are conducted in-room (at club or hotel) for a number of properties.  The in-room 
auction may be held on Thursday night or Friday morning for selling 10 to 15 houses.   
Although an auctioneer works for the seller, all bidders need to be treated honestly, fairly and 
ethically.  Thus, prior to opening the bidding process at auction time, the auctioneer will announce 
conditions of sale by public auction for real property in Queensland.  In Queensland, the potential 
buyers may choose not to register but still be able to bid (see Figure 3).  The auctioneer may bid on 
behalf of the vendor.  A copy of written authority to bid for another person should be given to the 
auctioneer prior to the bidding process.  Whilst in some other states like Victoria, all bidders have to 
register prior the bidding process starting. 
An auctioneer may hold the auction to seek further instructions from the vendor.  Then, the 
auctioneer continues the bidding process and re-announces the highest bid.   If the property has 
reached the reserved price, it will be announced that the property is ‘on the market’ or ‘selling’ and it 
will be sold to the highest bidder.  If it is not, the highest bidder will have the privilege to negotiate 
both price and condition of contracts with the vendor before passing-in the property under the 
exclusive listing under private treaty sales terms and conditions. 
Further discussion on comparing benefits and risks analyses of different stakeholders in the 
Brisbane residential auction market are shown in Table 2.  A housing transaction decision is made by 
the vendor usually under strong influence from the real estate agents who gain the opportunity to 
conduct an extensive advertisement campaign.  At the auction, the auctioneer provides a competitive 
environment (which is very effective in the boom time) and the buyers compare their wants and needs, 
egos and emotions plus the competitive will to win.  Although the same mechanism exists in the 
‘buyers’ market (down turn), the buyers are more selective and are not anxious to buy.  It is yet to be 
proved whether a unique property still achieves the same efficiency in different market conditions 
(boom and down turn).   
An auction is part of a marketing process to find a suitable buyer.  It is still considered 
successful if the property is sold prior to auction, on the auction day or within one week after the 
auction day.  Moreover, many of better properties are sold prior to auction day and this influences the 
sales clearance rate of auctions.  The next section will discuss the challenges in the Brisbane auction 
market as evidenced from recent property sales (in August to October 2005) such as the auction 
clearance rate. 
 
 
4. Auction Residential Property Market in Brisbane 
 
Brisbane is Australia's third largest city on a river, by the sea, with a mountain backdrop to the 
North-West and coastal farmland to the South.  Thus, it has potential to match a range of property 
preferences (e-CBD, 2005).  As the capital of the fastest growing and most liveable state in the 
country, Brisbane has the demand investors need to see excellent returns, and a climate which keeps 
smiles on residents faces all year round. The City of Brisbane has approximately 371,600 rateable 
properties, 338,349 residential properties, 76,192 apartments and 5,729 flats, 26,731 commercial 
properties (e-CBD, 2005). 
 
10 
Table 2. Comparative Benefits and Risks Analyses of Different Stakeholders in Brisbane Residential 
Auction Market 
 
Stakeholder 
(number of 
participants) 
Benefits Risks 
Buyer 
(6) 
• Instant results of their offer 
• More information of the subject property 
(in some cases) 
• Deals with other potential buyers and 
serious vendor who want to sell the 
property 
• Stretch their budget to win the property 
with maximum price they are prepared 
to pay (cannot offer the lowest price) 
• Spend higher up-front cost for searches 
and inspection prior to the auction day 
• No conditions on the contract under 
auction terms (such as building and 
finance approval), which is very difficult 
for first home buyers 
Vendor 
(5) 
• Better understanding of market price  
• More control to set the terms, 
conditions, undisclosed minimum 
reserve price 
• Information are better spread which 
mean more people to inspect the 
property and/ or come to the auction day 
• Deals with ‘true cash buyer’, 10% 
deposit is payable on the day of sale 
without uncertainty of financial 
condition 
• Stress on the uncertainty of the outcome 
of the auction result  
• Higher transaction cost for extensive 
advertisement 
• Unsuccessful auction which bring to 
private treaty contract sales with higher 
transaction cost and time. 
Real estate 
agent 
(7) 
• Gain an exclusive right to sell the 
subject property 
• More advertisement budget or exposure 
not just for the property but also their 
company.  More competitor bidders 
come to the auction day 
• Contract is set up for one final buyer and 
seller on the auction day 
• Fail to sell the property on the auction 
day, such as no bid condition, highest 
bid below the reserved price. 
 
Auctioneer 
(5) 
• Conduct auction 
• More competitive and committed buyers 
will bid at the auction day 
• More control to set the terms, 
conditions, undisclosed minimum 
reserve price 
• ‘worse property’ left for auction at the 
auction day (better one has sold prior to 
the auction day) 
• Put off other job but the property sold 
prior to the auction day.   
• Lost job if cannot do well on the job 
Financial 
institution 
(6) 
• Pre-approval finance conducted based 
on the buyer’s capacity which can be 
used for different property (subject to 
find the property) 
• Borrower buy over-valued property 
which increase the property risk 
 
Source: interview results(2005) 
 
 
As a result of a very competitive building sector and relatively low home and land prices, 
Brisbane real estate is much more affordable than Sydney and Melbourne.  The median house price in 
Brisbane is now around $330,000 which is relatively low compared to Sydney ($696,000). Owners 
should expect modest capital gains over the next 12 months and buyers can take respite in a market 
that is now simmering, as opposed to boiling. ABS (2005) indicated that Brisbane house price rose by 
only 1.5 per cent in the June 2005 quarter after falling 3 per cent in March 2005. 
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The above information provides some background to this study.  This initial study set out to 
determine the significance of the auction in the overall housing market, the reasons behind the recent 
change, and the implications of these changes. 
 
a. Market facts  
In the past boom market, 50 per cent of all real estate in Sydney was sold by auction.  During 
the same boom period, the Brisbane auction market only had 20 to 30 per cent market share.  Recently 
in Brisbane, the relative proportion of properties, differentiated by type of sale, was calculated in 
Table 3. Based on 24 month data (16 September 2003 to 15 September 2005), the total cases was 
around 67,422 (Australian Property Monitors, 2005), which was equal to 20 per cent of the total of 
residential properties of Brisbane areas. The auction listing was 6.75% of total transaction cases. The 
private treaty sales cases were 93.25% and mostly houses. 
 
Table 3. Properties Cases Sold of Different Housing Transaction 24-Month 
 
Brisbane Cases 
Auction 
listed 
Private  
Treaty 
Auction 
 sold 
Auction 
Clearance  
Rate  % 
  67,422 4,548 62,874 1,809   
   6.75% 93.25% 2.68% 39.78% 
Note:  The source of data in the second column (cases) from Australian Property Monitors (up to 15 
September 2005) of HPG data sample base, the rest is estimated figure from this study. 
 
Table 4 shows the volume trend in 2003 to 2005 of listed auction for residential property.  The 
residential auction market clearance rate (CR%)  was decreasing from 49.18% to 32.03%.  The auction 
value sold in November 2003 was $111.46 Million and a year after was down to $53.66 Million and 
up to mid 2005 went down to $24.98 Million. The decreasing trend of CR% and sold value amount 
indicate Brisbane being in the ‘downside’ of the property market cycle. This phenomenon may extend 
through to Christmas (Thompson, 2005). 
 
Table 4.    The Brisbane Auction Market Outlook 
 
Brisbane  
Number of  
Auction 
Number of 
 Sold 
Number of  
Withdrawn 
Clearance 
 Rate  % 
Value Sold 
 ($ Million) 
Nov-2003            452           240             36  49.18%       111.46  
Feb-2004            259           131               5  49.62%         66.83  
Apr-2004            280           134               8  46.53%         60.59  
Jun-2004            236            91             14  36.40%         46.84  
Nov-2004            251           103             28  36.92%         53.66  
Feb-2005            231           120             10  49.79%         52.22  
Apr-2005            242           100               9  39.84%         43.04  
Jun-2005            121            41               7  32.03%         24.98  
Source: Australian Property Monitors (2005).   
 
b. Recent Result of Residential Auction (mid August to early October 2005) 
The result of each weekend’s auction are published in the newspaper and website, however, 
this data set has some limitations and some reservations are expressed about the comprehensiveness of 
the information  as it does not always provide the total auctions held.  The published auction results 
only refer to three event types: sold, sold prior or passed in with the highest bid (HB) or vendor bid 
(VB).  The listed auction property may be sold prior if the seller may in fact accept an offer prior to 
the auction being held.  Auction sold refers to the sales completed at the conclusion of the auction 
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process (the strike of the auctioneer’s hammer).  The latter two events may not reach the sellers’ 
reserve price and the property may be passed in for subsequent private sale. 
Table 5 describes four sample weekends based on the previous week sales information and in-
room auction cases in Brisbane (HPG, 2005). The Courier Mail weekend recent auction results show 
the auction property market. The passing in result from the highest price bid (HB) is rising in the 
auction market as shown in Table 5. Table 4 and Table 5 based on the same data source but reported in 
different time period (weekly in Table 4 and last six weeks transaction in Table 5), the purpose of 
comparing those tables is to illustrate the changes of Clearance Rate (CR). During the four weeks 
observation periods, the average CR% was 48%, which was higher than the record of June 2005 in 
Table 4.   
 
Table 5. The Weekend Recent auction Results (2005) 
 
ID Input Date Transaction date Auction cases Sold 
Highest Bid 
(HB) 
Vendor Bid 
(VB) 
Clearance 
Rate  % 
1 20 Aug 2005 10 to 16 Aug 2005 22 11 7 4 50.00% 
2 24 Sep 2005 14 to 20 Sep 2005 31 18 6 7 58.06% 
3 1 Oct 2005 21 to 27 Sep 2005 37 15 17 5 40.54% 
4 8 Oct 2005 28 Sep to 4 Oct 2005 28 12 13 3 42.86% 
5 ** 7 Oct 2005 In-room aution 10 2 5 3 20.00% 
Source:  ID 1 to 4 from HPG (2005) 
 ID 5 ** from one of agents in room auction cases at Brisbane 
 
The following analyses based on the auction results from mid August to early October 2005.  
Recent house sales per postcode in the Australian Property Monitor’s website contain recent six week 
transaction.  The auction results from mid August to early October 2005 are noted as full list in the 
following analysis and the transaction on late September to early October 2005 are categorized as new 
list.   
The geo-distribution performances of recent house sales which are calculated from the Home 
Price Guide website are illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 6).  The comparison between the new and full 
list of action results in Figure 4 illustrates ripple effect in Brisbane's outer suburbs has been reversed 
and the auction home buyers are heading back to the inner city and inner suburbs.  The geo-statistics 
show the house type cases growth in the inner city, inner east and outer east, while the unit type geo-
distribution growth is located at inner city, and inner west. The average CR% is 40%; the unit type 
property is performing better than house type property (see Table 6).   
 
Table 6  Property House Type of Recent Sales 
 
Auction Grand Clearance 
Property  
Type 
Recent Sales * 
(mid August to 
early October 2005) 
 Highest 
Bid  Passed In  Sold Total  Rate  % 
 House Full list 43 37 41 121 35.54% 
  
New list 12 14 8 34 35.29% 
Unit Full list 7 2 6 15 46.67% 
  
New list 3 0 0 3 100.00% 
Grand Total Full list 50 39 47 136 36.76% 
  
New list 15 14 8 37 40.54% 
Source:  Australian Property Monitors (2005) 
Note: *  Full list transaction records from mid August to early October 2005 and new list transaction 
on late September to early October 2005  
 
13 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
 
Inn
er
 
Cit
y
 
Inn
er
 
Ea
st
 
Inn
er
 
No
rth
 
Inn
er
 
No
rth
-
Ea
st 
 
Inn
er
 
So
uth
 
Inn
er
 
We
st
 
Ou
ter
 
Ea
st 
 
Ou
ter
 
No
rth
 
Ou
ter
 
No
rth
-
Ea
st
 
Ou
ter
 
No
rth
-
We
st
 
Ou
ter
 
So
uth
 
Ou
ter
 
So
uth
-
Ea
st
 
Ou
ter
 
So
uth
-
We
st
 
Ou
ter
 
We
st
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
di
st
rib
u
tio
n
 
o
f t
o
ta
l a
u
ct
io
n
n
house house-new unit unit-new
  
 
Figure 4.   Geo-Distribution Performance of House and Unit Auction Sales (mid August to early 
October 2005) 
Source: Australian Property Monitors (2005) 
 
 
 
The 40 to 48 % clearance rate on house auctions indicated that buyers are more likely to get a 
bargain if a property is passed in because they can then negotiate a sales price from a stronger position. 
Then, there is the fact that the proportion of properties now being offered at auction is much smaller 
than it was at the height of the recent boom. Even when auctions do go ahead, people are not ready to 
bid. Sometimes the bidders are not prepared to make the first bid. Everyone is sitting back and 
observing what happens.  This downturn is cyclical, and from past experience, when an upturn comes, 
they will come back. But the number of auctions for Brisbane 2005 is at the lowest point in five years, 
and this time it will take a while (Thompson, 2005).  It represents a great opportunity for buyers.  
Table 7 listed top ten Brisbane selling agent based on their auction performance from mid 
August to early October 2005.  Ray White, RE/MAX and HARCOURT utilise auction more than the 
others.  The auction performance have larger distribution as illustrated by the clearance rate (CR%).  
As mentioned in the previous section, auction has more than six week turnover (see Figure 2 and 3), 
larger set of data will provide more meaningful explanation.  
 
Table 7. Top Ten Brisbane Selling Agent Auction Performance in mid August to early October 2005 
 
Selling Agent Total cases Auction Sold 
Auction 
 Highest Bid 
Auction 
 Passed In 
Clearance 
 Rate  % 
AC Ascot 2 2 0 0 100.0% 
Adcock Prestige 1 1 0 0 100.0% 
FN Metro 2 1 1 0 50.0% 
HAR 23 10 7 3 43.5% 
14 
LJH 3 2 0 1 66.7% 
PRD 4 1 0 2 25.0% 
Public Trustee of QLD 4 2 0 2 50.0% 
Ray White 70 18 26 16 25.7% 
RE/MAX 36 11 9 12 30.6% 
Space Property Agents 4 3 0 0 75.0% 
Source: Australian Property Monitors (2005) from mid August to early October 2005 
 
 
c. In room auction case study  
Recent Property Sales using the ‘in room’ auction other than the on-site auction have attracted 
more buyers to the Brisbane auction market.  Since no information available to count the bidding call 
times and the initial price, this initial study utilise a small case study (11 cases only) to investigate the 
competition level and indication of market efficiency.  Further study need to investigate the research 
outcome of this small sample study. 
From the in room auction case study we can gain more information about the Brisbane auction 
market. As mentioned in the literature review, the real estate auction belongs to the ‘common value 
auction’, the bidder information is open at auction site which creates a relationship between bidders. 
This information can be the judgment of pricing adjusted. In this case study, two sources of 
information is used as auction attributes: pre-price and initial price.  The recent property sold in the 
neighbourhoods is used as pre-price attribute and the starting bidding price is used as an initial price 
attribute. 
Two analyses on the 11 cases of in-room auction are shown in Table 8 and 9.  Table 8 shows 
the house attributes correlation of the auction final bid price and biding call times (proxy as the 
number of bidder). The more bidders the more the amount of the auction will rise. However weaker 
competition shown in this case study produces a weaker correlation (0.13, and worsen in unit property 
type -0.15).  In the weak competition circumstances, using the English auction market might produce 
an unexpected price. 
Table 9 shows the price difference theory, if the coverage rate is smaller than the market, the 
auction is relatively more effective than the private sales (search market). The coverage rate is 
computed from the two market comparisons, search and auction market.  In this case study the proxy 
results show the auction market coverage rate being smaller (82.22% in auction market, 386.60% in 
search market).  Therefore, the auction mechanism in this small case study (11 cases) is more efficient 
than the search market.  Both market efficiency and weak competition result for auction mechanism 
are only applied in this case.  A further study with a bigger data set will illustrate the Brisbane auction 
market efficiency. 
 
 
Table 8.  The Case Study In-Room Housing Auction Attributes Correlation 
 
House /ALL  Amount   area  
 biding  
call times   initial price   Pre-price  
 Amount  
  -0.49 /-0.49 0.13 /-0.15 0.94 /0.92 0.52 /0.67 
 area  
   -0.56 /-0.56 -0.30 /-0.30 0.51 /0.51 
 biding  
call times      -0.20 /-0.31 0.06 /0.01 
 initial price  
     0.66 /0.63 
 Pre-price  
      
All :  in-room auction house / unit included   
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Table 9.     The Case Study In-Room Housing Auction Market Pricing  
 
Cases 
Price 
Factors 
 
 
(1) 
Amount 
(2) 
Initial price 
(3) 
 Pre-price  
(4)=(1)-(2) 
Price diff 1 
(5)=(1)-(3) 
Price diff 2 
(6)=(3)-(2) 
Price diff 3 
(7)=(4)/(2) 
** 
Converage  
Rate % 
(8) )=(6)/(2) 
*** 
Converage  
Rate % 2 
Average $399,472 $316,111 $359,389 $83,361.1 -$29,892.9 $96,357 34.00% 8.12% 
STD 155034 140974 203399 $60,951.7 $177,161.5 180147  0.2796 0.3139 
CV 38.81% 44.60% 56.60% 73.12% -592.66% 186.96% 82.22% 386.60% 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the Brisbane auction market, the auction mechanism has pushed up-front higher transaction 
cost for vendors and potential buyers compared to private treaty sales.  Moreover, an unsuccessful 
auction is not only costly financially but also inefficient in terms of time.  An auction provides an 
instant result and a better understanding of market price.  As discussed in Table 2, vendors and their 
team gain more benefits by conducting an auction compared to potential buyers.  Moreover, buyers 
lose the privilege of having a five day cooling off period and being able to organise a more flexible 
financial arrangements. 
The combination of lower auction clearance rates, decreasing auction values and less than 
exciting price growth suggests that the Brisbane residential market is in a downside market cycle.  
Moreover, the lower clearance rate of the house auction outcomes illustrates the higher bargaining 
power on the buyer’s side.  The current situation has had a different impact on different suburbs.  The 
geo-statistics found a ripple effect occurring with auction home buyers heading back to the inner city 
and inner suburbs from Brisbane's outer suburbs. 
From the in-room case study of 11 cases, this study found weak competition which is reflected 
by the weak correlation (0.13).  The weak competition in the English Auction market might present an 
unexpected price.  This study uses the bidder calling time as a proxy for the number of bidders to 
compute the coverage rate.  Using the same sample, the coverage rate for auction market (82.22%) is 
smaller than the search market (386.60%).  Thus, the auction mechanism in the case study is more 
efficient than the private treaty market.  Due to the small sample size, this result can only apply to this 
case. Further study using more data cases will provide a better understanding of Brisbane market 
efficiency. 
In the auction process, the vendor and real estate agent have stood to gain greater benefits from 
auction mechanism than from private treaty sales.  However, on the downside, buyers have more 
bargaining power to negotiate favourable auction terms and conditions.  Moreover, if the property 
does not sell under the hammer at the auction day, the negotiating parties may resort to private treaty 
sales contract conditions. 
This initial paper leads to further research on modeling the historical data of auction results and 
studying the impact of unsuccessful auctions on the final result of the sales.  When the auction is 
passed-in, potential buyers have a greater bargaining position since the full terms of conditions of the 
contract for the purchase and sale of houses and land will be applied.  This may provide an opportunity 
to offer a lower price than what they can afford.  Thus, it is the real estate agent’s responsibility to 
adjust the reserve price to suit the prevailing market conditions. 
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